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Purpose
• Conduct a thorough analysis of the JSC Building 32 facility systems and 
utilities used to support test article integration activities in the facility and 
thermal-vacuum testing in Chamber A.
– Provide known risks and recommendations
– Provide counsel on facility risk reduction priorities
Background
• Why did we conduct this review?
Primary: Identify risk to the James Webb Space Telescope 
program and provide recommendations on risk-reduction 
measures 
Secondary: Validate and update the facility Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) in an effort to understand the facility’s 
fault tolerance
Methodology
• Step 1: Identify all major facility systems & utilities
– Helium refrigeration plant(s)
– Liquid Nitrogen storage and distribution system
– Rough vacuum system
– High vacuum system(s)
– Chamber airflow management system
– Facility heating, ventilation, & air conditioning (HVAC)
– Normal & emergency power
– Data acquisition, recording, & controls system
– Facility steam system
– Facility chilled water system
– Cooling tower
– Closed loop cooling water
– Etc…
Methodology
• Step 2: Break systems down into components and/or sub-
systems and populate into a matrix with supporting utilities.
JOHNSON SPACE CENTER - BLDG 32 - CHAMBER A SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND UTILITY MATRIX
JSC DIVISION JA BLDG 32 SYSTEMS
MAIN UTILIITES OR BACKUP SYSTEMS BLDG 24 CITY GRID B32 BACK UP SYSTEMS 
COMPRESSED AIR (SITE)
STEAM (SITE)
CHILLED WATER  (SITE)
POTABLE WATER (SITE)
NORMAL POWER (SITE)
EMERGENCY POWER (B32)
UPS  (B32)
UTILITIES 
X   = UTILIZED UTILITY 
1   = PERSONNEL INJURY/DEATH  (CRITICALITY 1)
2R = BACKUP SYSTEM (CRITICALITY 2R) (R=REDUNDANT)
2   = VULNERABLE COMPONENT (CRITICALITY 2)
3   = LOST/COMPRIMISED TEST OBJECTIVE  (CRITICALITY 3)
4   = NEGLIGIBLE EFFECT (CRITICALITY 4) C
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VACUUM SYSTEM
MAIN BACKING PUMPS & PROCESS VALVES
MAIN BLOWER VACUUM PUMPS & PROCESS VALVES
MAIN CONTROLS FOR ROUGHING 
MAIN ROUGHING CRYOBAFFLE
HI-VAC -TMP VACUUM BACKING PUMPS & VALVES
HI-VAC - CONTROLS FOR TURBO PUMP BACKING
HI-VAC - CONTROL SYSTEM  PLC
HI-VAC  TURBOPUMPS
HI-VAC  CRYOPUMPS
HI-VAC TMP CRYOBAFFLE
HI-VAC GATE VALVE S(TMP'S AND CMP'S)
Methodology
• Step 3: Identify system and utility dependencies and populate 
into the matrix.
– Dependencies should be identified and evaluated for individual 
system components and/or subsystems to the extent possible
– Start off by simply marking with an “X” if there is a dependency
Methodology
JOHNSON SPACE CENTER - BLDG 32 - CHAMBER A SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND UTILITY MATRIX
JSC DIVISION JA BLDG 32 SYSTEMS
MAIN UTILIITES OR BACKUP SYSTEMS BLDG 24 CITY GRID B32 BACK UP SYSTEMS 
COMPRESSED AIR (SITE) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
STEAM (SITE) X X
CHILLED WATER  (SITE) X X X X X X X
POTABLE WATER (SITE) X X X X X X X X X X X
NORMAL POWER (SITE) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
EMERGENCY POWER (B32) X X X X X X X X X X X X
UPS  (B32) X X X X
UTILITIES 
X   = UTILIZED UTILITY 
1   = PERSONNEL INJURY/DEATH  (CRITICALITY 1)
2R = BACKUP SYSTEM (CRITICALITY 2R) 
(R=REDUNDANT)
2   = VULNERABLE COMPONENT (CRITICALITY 2)
3   = LOST/COMPRIMISED TEST OBJECTIVE  (CRITICALITY 
3)
4   = NEGLIGIBLE EFFECT (CRITICALITY 4)
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VACUUM SYSTEM
MAIN BACKING PUMPS & PROCESS VALVES X X X X X
MAIN BLOWER VACUUM PUMPS & PROCESS VALVES X X X X X
MAIN CONTROLS FOR ROUGHING X
MAIN ROUGHING CRYOBAFFLE X X X
HI-VAC -TMP VACUUM BACKING PUMPS & VALVES X X X X X X X X X
HI-VAC - CONTROLS FOR TURBO PUMP BACKING X X X
HI-VAC - CONTROL SYSTEM  PLC X X X X
HI-VAC  TURBOPUMPS X X X X X
HI-VAC  CRYOPUMPS X X X X X
HI-VAC TMP CRYOBAFFLE X X X X
HI-VAC GATE VALVE S(TMP'S AND CMP'S) X X X X X X
It should look something like this…
Methodology
• Step 4: Evaluate systems for component/subsystem loss to 
determine those that result in system shut down/failure.
– This is in line with your Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA)
– This needs to be evaluated for each phase of your test/operation (as 
applicable). For example:
• Chamber @ rough vacuum, ambient temp
• Chamber @ high vacuum, ambient temp
• Chamber @ 80K (LN2 shrouds full cold)
• Chamber < 80K, but > 32K (helium shrouds cooling)
• Chamber < 32K (helium shrouds full cold)
Nominal Operations
Methodology: Helium Systems 
Methodology: Helium Systems 
Off-Nominal Operations
Off-Nominal Ops Criticality Failure Mode Cause Effects
Mode #1 2/3 Helium Train 1
Subsystem Single Point Failure: CMP1, CBX1
Loss of Utility Loss of Refrigeration to Helium CryoPumping Panels (CPP)
Mode #2 2R Compressor 3
Single Point failure
Loss of Utility Loss of Refrigeration to main Helium shroud/TA Zones
Mode #3 2R Coldbox 3 Single Point failure Loss of Refrigeration to main Helium shroud/TA Zones
Mode #4 2 Helium Zones Zone Leakage, Zone Control Valve Failure Loss of thermal control of Helium Zone
Mode #5 2R DARAC Single Point failure Loss of sub-system data monitoring and HMI control screens
Shutdown 2 Helium Plant Loss of Utility Loss of Refrigeration to Helium CPP, main Helium shroud/TA Zones
Off-Nominal #1: Loss CW, CLCW, on Train 1
Methodology: Helium Systems 
Methodology: Helium Systems 
• Effect:  Loss of Refrigeration to the Helium CryoPumping Panels
• Test Impacts:  Criticality 2 / 3
– Cooldown / Warm-Up:  Released of Condensed Gas (“Burp”) from CPP
– Steady State:  Condensed Gas transfers to the main Helium Shrouds
• Controls:
– System designed for 24-7 operations
– TGL22 Turbine 
• MTBF:  190,500 hrs
• MTTR:  3 hrs with spare
• Recommendation:
– Re-commission Helium Train 2 (inactive) as back-up
13
Methodology
• Step 5: Define system categories & use your failure mode 
analysis in previous step to determine what utility or component 
losses result in you realizing one of these category levels
– Examples:
• Category 1 – Loss of system could result in personnel injury or loss of life
• Category 2 – Loss of system could result in damage to test article or other 
critical facility hardware and ground support equipment
• Category 3 – Loss of system could result in loss of test objective or schedule 
delay
– Update matrix to show Category numbers in lieu of an “X” where 
applicable
Methodology
JOHNSON SPACE CENTER - BLDG 32 - CHAMBER A SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND UTILITY MATRIX
JSC DIVISION JA BLDG 32 SYSTEMS
MAIN UTILIITES OR BACKUP SYSTEMS BLDG 24 CITY GRID B32 BACK UP SYSTEMS 
COMPRESSED AIR (SITE) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
STEAM (SITE) X X
CHILLED WATER  (SITE) X X X X X X X
POTABLE WATER (SITE) X X X X X X X X X X X
NORMAL POWER (SITE) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
EMERGENCY POWER (B32) X X X X X X X X X X X X
UPS  (B32) X X X X
UTILITIES 
X   = UTILIZED UTILITY 
1   = PERSONNEL INJURY/DEATH  (CRITICALITY 1)
2R = BACKUP SYSTEM (CRITICALITY 2R) (R=REDUNDANT)
2   = VULNERABLE COMPONENT (CRITICALITY 2)
3   = LOST/COMPRIMISED TEST OBJECTIVE  (CRITICALITY 
3)
4   = NEGLIGIBLE EFFECT (CRITICALITY 4)
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VACUUM SYSTEM
MAIN BACKING PUMPS & PROCESS VALVES 2 2 2 2 X
MAIN BLOWER VACUUM PUMPS & PROCESS VALVES 2 2 2 2 X
MAIN CONTROLS FOR ROUGHING 2
MAIN ROUGHING CRYOBAFFLE 2 X X
HI-VAC -TMP VACUUM BACKING PUMPS & VALVES 2 2 2 X X X X X X
HI-VAC - CONTROLS FOR TURBO PUMP BACKING 2 X X
HI-VAC - CONTROL SYSTEM  PLC 2 X X X
HI-VAC  TURBOPUMPS 2 2 X X X
HI-VAC  CRYOPUMPS 2 X X X X
HI-VAC TMP CRYOBAFFLE 2 X X X
HI-VAC GATE VALVE S(TMP'S AND CMP'S) 2 2 X X X X
And you get something like this…
Methodology
• Step 6: Eliminate or Mitigate your Risk
– All Category 1 must be eliminated
– All Category 2 should be eliminated or must be controlled/mitigated 
through redundancy
– Category 3 can be eliminated/controlled if schedule & budget allow
Methodology
• Step 7: Evaluate for existing redundancy & update matrix
– Does the redundant system have same capacity as the primary?
– Does the redundant system fully meet requirements?
– Is the redundant system fully operational?
– Does the redundant system require reconfiguration to be employed?
• Are procedures in place?
• Are people trained?
• How long does it take to reconfigure?
Methodology
And you get something like this…
JOHNSON SPACE CENTER - BLDG 32 - CHAMBER A SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND UTILITY MATRIX
JSC DIVISION JA BLDG 32 SYSTEMS
MAIN UTILIITES OR BACKUP SYSTEMS BLDG 24 CITY GRID B32 BACK UP SYSTEMS 
COMPRESSED AIR (SITE) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
STEAM (SITE) X X
CHILLED WATER  (SITE) X X X X X X X
POTABLE WATER (SITE) X X X X X X X X X X X
NORMAL POWER (SITE) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
EMERGENCY POWER (B32) X X X X X X X X X X X X
UPS  (B32) X X X X
UTILITIES 
X   = UTILIZED UTILITY 
1   = PERSONNEL INJURY/DEATH  (CRITICALITY 1)
2R = BACKUP SYSTEM (CRITICALITY 2R) (R=REDUNDANT)
2   = VULNERABLE COMPONENT (CRITICALITY 2)
3   = LOST/COMPRIMISED TEST OBJECTIVE  (CRITICALITY 3)
4   = NEGLIGIBLE EFFECT (CRITICALITY 4) C
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VACUUM SYSTEM
MAIN BACKING PUMPS & PROCESS VALVES 2R 2 2 2 X
MAIN BLOWER VACUUM PUMPS & PROCESS VALVES 2R 2 2 2 X
MAIN CONTROLS FOR ROUGHING 2
MAIN ROUGHING CRYOBAFFLE 2R X X
HI-VAC -TMP VACUUM BACKING PUMPS & VALVES 2R 2R 2R X X X X X X
HI-VAC - CONTROLS FOR TURBO PUMP BACKING 2R X X
HI-VAC - CONTROL SYSTEM  PLC 2R X X X
HI-VAC  TURBOPUMPS 2R 2R X X X
HI-VAC  CRYOPUMPS 2R X X X X
HI-VAC TMP CRYOBAFFLE 2R X X X
HI-VAC GATE VALVE S(TMP'S AND CMP'S) 2R 2R X X X X
LIQUID NITROGEN (80 KELVIN)
Methodology
• Step 8: Address remaining critical areas and develop controls 
and/or system redundancy in order to reduce risk to an 
acceptable level
So, after completing this process for JSC Building 32, 
this is what we found…
20
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Roughing 
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Instrument Air
To  Atm
To  Cold Box 3
From LN2  Phase Separator
Helium Refrigeration System
URR  4/18/12
Compressor 3 URR  3/9/12
To  Atm
INTEGRATED MECHANICAL 
SYSTEM
To  Atm
AFMS
MAU FCU
BLO-1 HTR-1
PCW STM
CW
Findings/Lessons Learned
• No Critical 1 areas identified
• Only a few Critical 2 areas 
were found
– Vacuum System: Power & Cooling 
Water
– Helium Compressor (Train 3): 
Cooling Water
– Chamber A Environmental 
Control: Cooling Water
JOHNSON SPACE CENTER - BLDG 32 - CHAMBER A SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND UTILITY MATRIX
JSC DIVISION JA BLDG 32 SYSTEMS
MAIN UTILIITES OR BACKUP SYSTEMS BLDG 24 CITY GRID B32 BACK UP SYSTEMS 
COMPRESSED AIR (SITE) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
STEAM (SITE) X X
CHILLED WATER  (SITE) X X X X X X X
POTABLE WATER (SITE) X X X X X X X X X X X
NORMAL POWER (SITE) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
EMERGENCY POWER (B32) X X X X X X X X X X X X
UPS  (B32) X X X X
UTILITIES 
X   = UTILIZED UTILITY 
1   = PERSONNEL INJURY/DEATH  (CRITICALITY 1)
2R = BACKUP SYSTEM (CRITICALITY 2R) (R=REDUNDANT)
2   = VULNERABLE COMPONENT (CRITICALITY 2)
3   = LOST/COMPRIMISED TEST OBJECTIVE  (CRITICALITY 3)
4   = NEGLIGIBLE EFFECT (CRITICALITY 4) C
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VACUUM SYSTEM
MAIN BACKING PUMPS & PROCESS VALVES 2R 2 2 2 X
MAIN BLOWER VACUUM PUMPS & PROCESS VALVES 2R 2 2 2 X
MAIN CONTROLS FOR ROUGHING 2
MAIN ROUGHING CRYOBAFFLE 2R X X
HI-VAC -TMP VACUUM BACKING PUMPS & VALVES 2R 2R 2R X X X X X X
HI-VAC - CONTROLS FOR TURBO PUMP BACKING 2R X X
HI-VAC - CONTROL SYSTEM  PLC 2R X X X
HI-VAC  TURBOPUMPS 2R 2R X X X
HI-VAC  CRYOPUMPS 2R X X X X
HI-VAC TMP CRYOBAFFLE 2R X X X
HI-VAC GATE VALVE S(TMP'S AND CMP'S) 2R 2R X X X X
LIQUID NITROGEN (80 KELVIN)
LN2 PANEL STRUCTURE X X
SCAVENGER PANELS 2R X X X X
GN2 STEAM TRIM HEATER & CRU PUMPS X 2R X X X
CONTROL SYSTEM PLC 2R X X X
LN2 COLD BOX 2R 2R X X X X X
LN2 VALVE BOX 2R 2R X X X X X
SHROUD ZONE CONTROL VALVES 2R 2R X X X X
PRESSURE BUILD UP VAPORIZER 2R 2R X X X X X X
WARM UP VAPORIZERS 2R 2R X X X X X
COMPONENT VALVE CONTROL 2R 2R X X X X
BULK STORAGE TANKS X
VACUUM ANNULUS PUMPS 2R X X X
PRESSURE INDICATOR CONTROLLERS 2R X
BULK STORAGE TANK INSTRUMENTATION 2R X X
HELIUM SYSTEM  (12 KELVIN)
HELIUM SHROUDS X
HELUM PANEL ZONE CONTROL PLC 2R X X
HELIUM PANEL ZONE CONTROL VALVES 2R 2R X X X X
CRYOPUMPING PANELS CONTROL PLC 2R X X
CRYOPUMPING PANELS CONTROL VALVES 2R 2R X X X X
UNIT #1 (3.5 KW)
COMPRESSOR #1 2R 2R X X X X
COMPRESSOR #1 PLC 2R X
COLD BOX #1 2R 2R X X X X X X
COLD BOX #1 PLC 2R X
COLD BOX #1 HEATER 2R X X
UNIT #2  (3.5 KW)
COMPRESSOR #2 2R 2R X X X X
COMPRESSOR #2 PLC 2R X
COLD BOX #2 2R 2R X X X X X X
COLD BOX #2 PLC 2R X
COLD BOX #2 HEATER 2R X X
UNIT #3 (12.5 KW)
COMPRESSOR #3 2R 2R X 2 X X
COMPRESSOR #3 PLC 2R X
COLD BOX #3 2R X 2R X X X 2R X X
COLD BOX #3 PLC 2R X
COLD BOX #3 HEATER 2R X X
HELIUM SHROUD BAKEOUT HEATER 2R X X
AIR FLOW SYSTEM
FILTER COIL AIR HANDLER 2R 2R X X X
BLOWER 1 X X
MAKE UP AIR UNIT 2R 2R 2R X X X X
VALVE CONTROL 2R X X
CONTROL SYSTEM 2R
HEATER 1 2R X X X
CHILLED WATER BOOSTER PUMP X 2R X
CLEAN ROOM
FILTER BANKS
RECIRCULATION FANS 2R X
MAKE UP AIR UNIT
AIR VALVE DAMPERS 2R X
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
COOLING COIL #1 & #2 & CONTROL VALVES X 2R X X
HEATING COIL #3 & CONTROL VALVES X 2R X X X
HOT WATER HEAT GNERATOR (4TH FLOOR) X X 2 X X
HOT WATER PUMPS P-22, P23 (4TH FLOOR) X 2 X
FFU SUPPLY FAN 2R X X
HUMIDIFIER 2R X X X
25 TON CRANE 2R X
AIR COMPRESSOR (AIR BARGE) 4
LIGHTING 2R X
AIR SHOWER 2R X
OTHER
DARS 2R 2R X X
AIR HANDLERS X 2R 2R
REST ROOMS X 2R
MAIN CORE SWITCH (CONNECTS ALL NETWORKS) 2R 2R X X
REMOTE SWITCHES 2R X X
JUNIPER FIREWALL 2R 2R X X
IRD SERVERS (IPAM) - ACTIVE DIRECTORY SERVER 2R 2R X X
COMMUNICATION NETWORK 2R 2R X X
LIGHTING 2R
Actions Taken: Vacuum System
• Placed chamber rough vacuum system & cooling tower 
pumps/fans on emergency power
– Replaced power distribution
– Installed new transfer switches & breaker panels
– Rental generator (2MW) & diesel tank provide 5 days run-time
Actions Taken: Helium Compressor 3
• Placing cooling tower pumps/fan on emergency power 
eliminates failure mode due to loss of cooling water to 
compressor 3
• Additionally, identified operational method providing 
redundancy on train 3 using the compressor from train 1
– Requires temporary shutdown and minor reconfiguration of valves
– Replicated failure during test and observed no thermal or 
contamination concerns for time required to reactivate system
– Although Compressor 1 is smaller, it demonstrated sufficient 
capacity to cool and maintain temperatures on GHe shrouds
Actions Taken: Chamber Airflow Management System
• Installed fully-redundant backup system run off a 1MW 
generator
– Ties into system at makeup air unit on roof
Summary
• Although a time-consuming process, we gained a much better 
understanding of our facility systems and their level of fault 
tolerance
• We have a clear understanding of our risk and are confident 
that a facility system/utility failure will not negatively impact 
sensitive/critical hardware in the chamber
• Strongly recommend others take the time to implement this or 
a similar process prior to the next test of critical hardware
Questions
?
